In this paper, we examine the long-run behavior of regularized, no-regret learning in1 finite games. A well-known result in the field states that the empirical frequencies2 of no-regret play converge to the game's set of coarse correlated equilibria; however,3 our understanding of how the players' actual strategies evolve over time is much4 more limited - and, in many cases, non-existent. This issue is exacerbated by5 a series of recent results showing that only strict Nash equilibria are stable and6 attracting under regularized learning, thus making the relation between learning7 and pointwise solution concepts particularly elusive. In lieu of this, we take a more8 general approach and instead seek to characterize the setwise rationality properties9 of the players' day-to-day play. To that end, we focus on one of the most stringent10 criteria of setwise strategic stability, namely that any unilateral deviation from the11 set in question incurs a cost to the deviator - a property known as closedness under12 better replies (club).

Adversarial risk quantifies the performance of classifiers on adversarially perturbed data. Numerous definitions of adversarial risk--not all mathematically rigorous and differing subtly in the details--have appeared in the literature. In this paper, we revisit these definitions, make them rigorous, and critically examine their similarities and differences. Our technical tools derive from optimal transport, robust statistics, functional analysis, and game theory. Our contributions include the following: generalizing Strassen's theorem to the unbalanced optimal transport setting with applications to adversarial classification with unequal priors; showing an equivalence between adversarial robustness and robust hypothesis testing with -Wasserstein uncertainty sets; proving the existence of a pure Nash equilibrium in the two-player game between the adversary and the algorithm; and characterizing adversarial risk by the minimum Bayes error between a pair of distributions belonging to the -Wasserstein uncertainty sets. Our results generalize and deepen recently discovered connections between optimal transport and adversarial robustness and reveal new connections to Choquet capacities and game theory.

This work is dedicated to the algorithm design in a competitive framework, with the primary goal of learning a stable equilibrium. We consider the dynamic price competition between two firms operating within an opaque marketplace, where each firm lacks information about its competitor. The demand follows the multinomial logit (MNL) choice model, which depends on the consumers' observed price and their reference price, and consecutive periods in the repeated games are connected by reference price updates. We use the notion of stationary Nash equilibrium (SNE), defined as the fixed point of the equilibrium pricing policy for the single-period game, to simultaneously capture the long-run market equilibrium and stability. We propose the online projected gradient ascent algorithm (OPGA), where the firms adjust prices using the first-order derivatives of their log-revenues that can be obtained from the market feedback mechanism. Despite the absence of typical properties required for the convergence of online games, such as strong monotonicity and variational stability, we demonstrate that under diminishing step-sizes, the price and reference price paths generated by OPGA converge to the unique SNE, thereby achieving the no-regret learning and a stable market. Moreover, with appropriate step-sizes, we prove that this convergence exhibits a rate of O(1/t).

In two-player zero-sum extensive-form games, Nash equilibrium prescribes optimal strategies against perfectly rational opponents. However, it does not guarantee rational play in parts of the game tree that can only be reached by the players making mistakes. This can be problematic when operationalizing equilibria in the real world among imperfect players. Trembling-hand refinements are a sound remedy to this issue, and are subsets of Nash equilibria that are designed to handle the possibility that any of the players may make mistakes. In this paper, we initiate the study of equilibrium refinements for settings where one of the players is perfectly rational (the "machine") and the other may make mistakes.

In two-player zero-sum extensive-form games, Nash equilibrium prescribes optimal strategies against perfectly rational opponents. However, it does not guarantee rational play in parts of the game tree that can only be reached by the players making mistakes. This can be problematic when operationalizing equilibria in the real world among imperfect players. Trembling-hand refinements are a sound remedy to this issue, and are subsets of Nash equilibria that are designed to handle the possibility that any of the players may make mistakes. In this paper, we initiate the study of equilibrium refinements for settings where one of the players is perfectly rational (the "machine") and the other may make mistakes.